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MARIA ANGELA JARDIM DE SANTA CRUZ OLIVEIRA* AND
NUNO GAROUPA**

Choosing Judges in Brazil: Reassessing Legal
Transplants from the United States***t
This Papercompares the Brazilian with the United States general
procedures of judicial selection at the state and federal levels. The
most significant difference between the two approachesis that in Brazil the selection at the lower level is entirely administered by the
judiciary, while in the United States, judges are either approved by
the executive or elected by popular vote. At the Supreme Court level,
however, the Brazilian Constitution uses the same mechanism that is
used in the United States, namely presidential nomination and Senate confirmation. This Article contends that the constitutional
transplant of the U.S. model of judicial selection, at the Supreme
Court level, has produced a marked balance of power between different branches of the Braziliangovernment and has led to significantly
fewer conflicts between the president and the Senate than in the
United States. We will try to explain why apparently identical legal
institutions have evolved in such different ways, in particularfocusing on the specific role of the Senate in confirming presidential
nominees.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The selection of judges has always been a difficult process, designed to develop and assure a fair and effective rule of law. The
separation of power demands an independent judiciary. If institu* PhD candidate in international law at the Graduate Institute of International
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tions are to function properly, the judiciary must be accountable, yet
the requirements of independence and accountability push the structure of judicial institutions in opposite directions.' Each legal system
responds to this complex trade-off according to the needs of the country, its local peculiarities and the expectations of its people when it
comes to dispute resolution. International pressure and globalization
add new requirements to legal reforms addressing judicial independence and accountability.
Legal scholars have frequently distinguished between "career
judges" and "recognition judges." 2 The career judiciary usually is part
of the prevalent system in Europe and in civil law jurisdictions more
generally, while the recognition judiciary is mostly associated with
the United States and other common law jurisdictions.
A career judiciary is part of a system that includes the following
features: (1) judges are initially appointed to junior positions either
in trial courts or assisting senior judges; (2) judges are promoted to
senior positions at later stages which may include positions on the
supreme court; (3) tenure is not attached to a particular position but
to the entire career; and (4) transfers to courts of equal seniority
levels are generally allowed. 3 Usually, the appointment mechanisms
used in civil law jurisdictions largely insulate career judiciaries from
political considerations. 4
A recognition judiciary is part of a different system that tends to
include the following features: (1) judges are selected after an initial
career in a legal profession; (2) judges are not usually promoted; and
(3) tenure is attached to a specific court (not always, but in many
cases life tenure). A recognition judiciary tends to rely on appointment mechanisms that involve the other branches of government,
and therefore are often more politicized in nature.5
Each system entails different characteristics. The precise design
of each of the mechanisms for judicial appointment-assessment and
removal-provides for a specific balance between external and internal audiences. 6 Other aspects of the judicial system, including the
possibility of separating opinions and dissents, sentencing and proce1. See Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Guarding The Guardians: Judicial
Councils and Judicial Independence, 57 AM. J. Comp. L. 103 (2009), and Nuno
Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, The Comparative Law and Economics of Judicial Councils, 27 BERKELEY J. INr'L L. 52 (2009).
2. See, among others, Nicholas Georgakopoulos, Independence in the Careerand
Recognition Judiciary, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 205 (2000).
3. Id.
4. See Garoupa & Ginsburg, Guardingthe Guardiansand Garoupa & Ginsburg,
The Comparative Law and Economics of JudicialCouncils, supra note 1.
5. See Georgakopoulos, supra note 2.
6. See Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, JudicialAudiences and Reputation:Perspectives from Comparative Law, 47 COLuM. J. TRANSNATL L. 451 (2009), and Nuno
Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Reputation, Information, and the Organizationof the Judiciary, 4 J. CoMP. L. 201 (2010).
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dural discretion, the scope of appeals (for example, de novo review),
the use of citations, the court's powers to select cases, the management and budget of the court system, and the size of the courts enter
into play.7 Not surprisingly, career and recognition judiciaries
emerge in very different institutional settings.
It has been acknowledged that career and recognition judiciaries
are generalist classifications. Recognition judiciaries in the federal
courts in the United States are not identical with recognition judges
in the United Kingdom. 8 Many states in the United States elect their
judges for fixed terms whereas the appointment mechanism to the
federal courts involves nomination by the President and confirmation
by the Senate.
Career judiciaries in Germany, France, Italy or Japan look similar in many regards but also show significant differences. 9 For
instance, the judges of constitutional courts in most civil law countries are more easily described as a recognition judiciary rather than
a career judiciary. Finally, some career judiciaries may have more
discretion (such as Germany) than some recognition judiciaries (such
as the United Kingdom).10
Distinctions between career and recognition judiciaries are useful to identify general approaches to bringing about a balance
between independence and accountability and to analyze particular
incentives and institutional attributes." However, in order to understand the proper functioning of a particular judiciary, we cannot rely
all too heavily on this particular classification because it is too broad
and probably too divorced from the defining institutional factors.12
In this context, Brazil is an important and interesting example.
Due to the Portuguese colonization and influence, Brazil is a civil law
country, and codification occurred after independence (1822).13 As
with most civil law jurisdictions, Brazil has a career judiciary for the
7. Id. For example, in Brazil, dissenting votes are allowed, dissenting opinions
are published, and the judiciary manages the court system with an independent
budget. In addition, courts' deliberations are open to the public.
8. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAw AND LEGAL THEORY IN THE UK AND THE USA
(1996).
9. From an outside, common law point of view they might look similar. However,
there are significant differences. For example, in France or Italy, a powerful judicial
council prevails while that is not the case in Germany or in Japan.
10. See Georgakopoulos, supra note 2.
11. See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same
Thing as Everybody Else), 3 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993); Richard A. Posner, Judicial
Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1259
(2005); and RicHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK (2008).
12. This happens in the same way that general references to the "common law
system" or the "civil law system" can be problematic when addressing particular issues. See Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World's
Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. Comp. L. 45 (1997).
13. Under the 1824 Constitution, the Brazilian legislator was supposed to enact a
civil code and a criminal code. The criminal code was enacted in 1830 and the code of
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first instance courts. Nevertheless, judges for higher courts include,
other than the career judiciary, successful legal practitioners laterally entering late in their careers as well as senior law professors, as
with the standard recognition judiciary. Indeed, it is more accurate to
say that Brazil has a mixed system of judicial selection with components usually associated with civil law countries (career judiciary) as
well as elements typically found in the common law systems (recognition judiciary). Whereas the career judiciary can be traced back to the
civil law tradition related to the Portuguese colonization, the recognition judiciary at the Supreme Court level results directly from the
influence of the U.S. Constitution in Brazil. 14
Like the United States, Brazil is a federation with (twentyseven) state systems in addition to a federal system. This federal system, includes specialized courts: labor courts, electoral courts, and
military courts. However, in contrast to the U.S. Constitution, the
Brazilian Federal Constitution prescribes the methods of selection of
judges not only in the federal judicial system, but also for state
courts. Article 125 establishes expressly that the state judicial systems shall follow the principles of the Federal Constitution.1 5
Therefore, both state and federal judges are bound by the same general rules. As a result, the Brazilian judiciary, despite the separate
federal and state jurisdictions, is regulated by a uniform rule that
eliminates the significant differences we find in the United States.
At the top of the Brazilian court system is the Supreme Federal
Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal), which is essentially responsible
for safeguarding the Constitution, as stated in Article 102 of the Federal Constitution.16 The Supreme Federal Court (hereinafter
"Supreme Court") is the court of last resort in constitutional matters.
It has jurisdiction over the entire nation and may receive appeals
against judgments rendered by the lower courts. The Supreme Court
is also in charge of abstract constitutional review of federal and state
criminal procedure in 1832. After several attempts, the civil code was finally enacted
in 1916 (a new civil code has been enacted in 2002).
14. See Maria Angela Jardim de Santa Cruz Oliveira, Reforming the Brazilian
Supreme Court: A Comparative Approach, 5 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 99
(2006).
15. Article 125 of the Federal Constitution reads: "The states shall organize their
judicial system, observing the principles established in this Constitution. (1) The competence of the courts shall be defined in the Constitution of the state, and the law of
judicial organization shall be the initiative of the Court of Justice. (2) (. .
16. Article 102 of the Federal Constitution reads:
The Supreme Federal Court is responsible, essentially, for safeguarding the
Constitution, and it is within its competence: (. . .) III - to judge, on extraordinary appeal, cases decided in a sole or last instance, when the decision
appealed: a) is contrary to a provision of this Constitution; b) declares a
treaty or a federal law unconstitutional; c) considers valid a law or act of a
local government contested in the light of this Constitution; d) considers
valid local law contested in the light of federal law (. .
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laws a characteristic borrowed from the European model of constitutional adjudication.' 7
The composition and the appointment mechanism to the Brazilian Supreme Court follow closely the U.S. model, which is not
surprising given the influence of the U.S. Constitution on the 1891
Brazilian Constitution. However, the direct transplant of the U.S.
model of selection and appointment of justices has not reproduced the
same institutional patterns. This Paper explains why the transplant
of a particular appointment mechanism does not necessarily produce
the same institutional outcome. Local determinants matter and
shape the implementation of a particular transplant.
There are three plausible explanations for the different attitudes
displayed by the U.S. and Brazilian Senates toward Supreme Court
nominees:
(a) The stakes in appointing Supreme Court justices in Brazil are
lower due to ideological and cultural differences between the two
countries, such as fewer clashes between a partisan-oriented ideological majority and minority in Brazil;
(b) The balance of power between the states and the federal government as well as between the main political parties differs. For
instance, since Brazil does not have a stable two-party system, and
the Senate is not polarized and structured around a two-party
tradition;
(c) Since there is a career judiciary in Brazil, a deferential Senate
contributes to a more effective system of checks and balances between the federal government and this career judiciary; a less
deferential Senate would inevitably reduce presidential influence in
selecting judges and thereby empower the career judiciary.
These three elements are all of equal importance and explain
why a transplant has evolved into a different institutional arrangement.' 8 Based on these explanations, the Article identifies
interesting differences between the Brazilian and American political
and legal systems.
We will start by explaining the methods ofjudge selection in Brazil in some detail. There are several methods, varying according to
the kind of judgeship position involved. Depending on the level of the
court, a specific method applies (summarized in Annexes 1 and 2).
17. The Supreme Federal Court also has original jurisdiction over various controversies, and appellate jurisdiction concerning political crimes and a few cases judged
originally by the Superior Courts. A complete explanation of the Supreme Federal
Court jurisdiction will not be presented here since it is not the focus of this Article.
For further details on the Supreme Federal Court jurisdiction, see Oliveira, supra
note 14.
18. Other authors have focused on the party system. See, for example, Leany Barreiro Lemos & Mariana Llanos, The Supreme Court Nominations in Brazil (19852010): Presidentialor CoalitionalPreferences?, mimeograph on file with the authors
(2010).
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The second part of the paper discusses the influence of the American
model on appointments to the Brazilian Supreme Court and the implications for current institutional arrangements. In particular, we
assess the extent to which a legal transplant concerning rules of judicial appointment produces different outcomes depending on local
determinants.
II.

METHODS OF JUDICIAL SELECTION IN BRAZIL

In order to explain the methods of judicial selection, it is necessary to first briefly introduce the court system of Brazil. As
mentioned above, at the federal level there are the courts of general
(federal) jurisdiction as well as three specialized tribunals: labor,
electoral and military courts. Each of them have trial courts, regional
appellate courts, and one national court of last resort, known as "Superior Courts" (Tribunais Superiores),1 9 except for the military
division, which has trial courts and one nationwide appellate court
only. At the state level, each state has trial courts and one appellate
court.
For practical purposes, we will divide the methods of selecting
judges according to the judgeship level into four main categories:
trial, appellate, superior courts and the Supreme Court.
A.

Trial Court Judgeships

Article 93 of the Brazilian Constitution states the principles to be
observed by the Statute of the Judicature (Estatutoda Magistratura),
which, as mentioned earlier, applies to every judge in the country. 2 0
19. The federal courts of general jurisdiction are divided among five regions; each
region has many trial courts and one Federal Regional Court (appellate court). The
labor courts are distributed among twenty-four regions and each of these regions includes various trial courts and one Regional Labor Court (appellate court). On the
other hand, electoral courts are scattered over twenty- seven regions, and each of
these regions comprises several electoral trial courts and one Regional Electoral
Court (appellate court).
20. Article 93 of the Federal Constitution reads:
A supplementary law, proposed by the Supreme Federal Court, shall provide
for the Statute of the Judicature, observing the following principles: I - admission into the career, with the initial post of substitute judge, by means of
a civil service entrance examination of tests and presentation of academic
and professional credentials, with the participation of the Brazilian Bar Association in all phases, it being required for the law bachelors a minimum of
three years' experience in juridical activities, obeying the order of classification for appointments; II - promotion from level to level, based on seniority
and merit alternately, observing the following rules: a) the promotion of a
judge who has appeared in a merit list for three consecutive times or for five
alternate times is mandatory; b) merit promotion requires two years in office
in the respective level and that the judge should appear in the top fifth part
of the seniority list of such level, unless no one satisfying such requirements
is willing to accept the vacant post; c) appraisal of merit according to the
criteria of promptness and reliability in the exercise of the jurisdictional
function and according to attendance and achievement in official or recog-
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This Article states that one must pass an entry-level examination to
be admitted to a judicial career. In other words, anyone interested in
being a trial judge at the state or federal levels has to pass this exam.
The tests are administered according to vacancy needs and are only
open to applicants with a bachelor's degree in law and at least three
years of professional legal experience.
The Brazilian career judiciary has its peculiarities when compared to the European model. In Brazil, candidates do not have to
attend a special school for judges as a prerequisite to taking the entry
exam. In addition, there is no compulsory long-term program of study
at judicial training schools. To be sure, there are judicial training
schools in the state and federal judiciaries, all of them work independently and some of them are private (not owned and managed by
state or federal governments, but by judges' associations). But these
judicial training schools provide short-term courses for new judges,
as well as continued education for judges at any point in their careers. In the past few years, the National School of Judicial Training
and Improvement (Escola Nacional de Formagdo e Aperfeigoamento
de Magistrados) was created to regulate, authorize and accredit
courses for judges. 2 1 Unlike in the French or the Italian models, there
is a variety of training schools. 22
The entry-level examination traditionally consists of three
phases: written examinations oral examinations, and an evaluation
of academic and professional credentials such as graduate studies,
publications and years of work experience. In recent times, examinations for trial judgeships at both the state and the federal levels have
included a fourth phase: a four-month course provided by the state
and federal judicial training schools. 2 3 The examination is run by the
nized improvement courses; d) in determining seniority, the court may only
reject the judge with the longest service by the justified votes of two-thirds of
its members, according to a specific procedure, ample defense being assured,
the voting being repeated until the selection is determined; e) there shall not
be promoted the judge who, without cause, retains case files longer than the
time determined by law, it being forbidden to return them to the court without the proper sentence or other applicable action; III - access to the courts of
second instance shall obey seniority and merit, alternately, as determined at
the last or only level; (. .

21. Prescribed by Constitutional Amendment 45 of 2004, Article 105, sole paragraph, section I, the National School of Judicial Training and Improvement was
created on November 30, 2006, under the Superior Court of Justice [Superior Tribunal de Justipal. It should be noted that Constitutional Amendment 45 of 2004 also
created a separate national school of judicial training for labor judges only.
22. There are twenty-nine state judicial schools, and five federal schools. See
(last visited
http://www.stj.jus.br/portal-stj/publicacao/engine.wsp?tmp.area=792
Mar. 16, 2010). Furthermore, every Brazilian state has a judicial school of electoral
jurisdiction, except one. See http://www.tse.gov.br/eje/html/apresentacao.html (last
visited Sept. 13, 2010). In addition, there are judicial schools for labor judges only. See
http//www.enamat.gov.br/?page id=65 (last visited Sept. 13, 2010).
23. See Resolution n.1, 17 September 2007, issued by the National School of Judicial Training and Improvement (EscolaNacional de Formaqdo e AperfeiCoamento de
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appellate court that has jurisdiction over the vacant positions for
trial judgeships, through a board of examiners. The Brazilian Bar Association participates in this selection process by appointing a lawyer
of its choice to the examination board.
After passing the entrance test, the candidates will take office in
order of classification; in other words, candidates who obtain the
highest scores are hired first. These newly-admitted judges then receive the title of "substitute judge" (juiz substituto), the entry-level
position. 2 4 It is important to note that a substitute judge has the
same duties and responsibilities as a senior trial judge. After two
years in office, trial judges acquire life tenure 25 and serve to the
mandatory retirement age of seventy.
The electoral courts have a special structure. The electoral judicial system has jurisdiction over controversies arising out of election
processes and is responsible for running elections in Brazil. This entails duties ranging from keeping registration lists to organizing the
poll sites, as well as certifying election results and announcing the
winners. Therefore, electoral court judgeships are not filled by an entry-level examination. They are comprised of state judges,
experienced lawyers, and public prosecutors who undertake their
electoral function in conjunction with their primary job for a two-year
term; one consecutive term is permitted.
B. Appellate Court Judgeships
The Brazilian Constitution provides general rules of access to appellate courts. In general, judges of first instance fill appellate court
seats. The appellate courts themselves select these first instance
judges through an alternate criterion of seniority and merit. This
means that if the previous appellate judge was selected by seniority,
the next will be exclusively chosen by merit, and vice-versa.
When the selection is based on seniority, the appellate court may
reject the most senior judge only by a reasoned two-thirds vote of its
members; the candidates are allowed fully to defend themselves
against the arguments made against their promotion. Elevation
based on merit considers a judge's performance and reliability in the
exercise of his or her judicial functions as well as attendance in accredited or official advanced legal education courses. Article 93,
Magistrados), and Resolution n.41, 19 December 2009, issued by the Council of Federal Justice (Conselho da JustigaFederal).This course consists of a total of 480 hours,
spread over four months (an average of a six-hour class per work day).
24. "Substitute judges" usually circulate throughout several districts and different specialized trial courts, and substitute for senior judges during their vacations or
leaves, or help overburdened judges.
25. During the first two years in office of entry-level judges, the respective appellate court may discharge "substitute" judges. After this period, judges may only be
dismissed by a judicial decision, res judicata.
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section II, subpart b, of the Brazilian Constitution prescribes that
merit-based promotion requires two years in office at the respective
level and that the judge should be in the top fifth of the seniority list
of such level, unless no one satisfying these requirements is willing to
accept the vacant post. 2 6 The promotion of a judge who entered a
merit list three consecutive times or five non-consecutive times is
mandatory.
Whenever possible, federal appellate court judges are selected in
their respective region. They must be Brazilian nationals between
the ages of thirty to sixty-five at the time of their appointment. As
mentioned, career federal judges who are promoted by seniority or
merit occupy the majority of seats in the federal regional courts.
However, the Brazilian Constitution reserves one-fifth of the federal
appellate court seats for members of the Brazilian Bar Association as
well as members of the Public Prosecution, to be chosen by the President of Brazil (quinto constitucional). These seats are distributed
alternately to knowledgeable and reputable lawyers with more than
ten years of law practice and to members of the Federal Public Prosecution with over ten years of service. In other words, if the previous
appellate judge was selected from a pool of lawyers, the next will be
chosen from a pool of federal public prosecutors.
Executive choice is very restricted at the federal appellate courts,
however. Either the bar association or the public prosecution's office,
depending on whose turn it is to fill the appellate judgeship, conducts
an internal selection process and then provides a list of six qualified
members to the appellate court. The federal appellate court (Tribunal
Regional Federal)then nominates three out of the six candidates suggested and submits them to the President of Brazil who has twenty
days to select any of the three to fill the appellate judgeship position.
The state appellate courts (Tribunaisde Justiga)follow the same
process as for selecting federal appellate judgeships: four-fifths of the
seats are filled by judges of first instance, the remaining fifth by lawyers and state public prosecutors. However, at the state level, the
state governor, rather than the President of Brazil, chooses one-fifth
of the seats from a list of three nominees presented by the state appellate court, selected from six candidates provided by either the bar
association or state public prosecution.
Electoral appellate courts have a different judicial selection process because of their special duties of regulating the federal, state
and municipal elections. There is one electoral appellate court (Tribunal Regional Eleitoral) in each state of Brazil. Electoral appellate
courts have a mixed composition of lawyers, as well as state and federal judges, each with a two year-mandate that only permits one
26. See Lemos & Llamos, supra note 18.
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consecutive term. Electoral appellate courts comprise seven judgeship positions. Two of these positions are set aside for state trial
judges, and two for state appellate judges; all of these positions are
filled by secret ballot among state appellate court judges. Another
seat is reserved for a federal appellate judge of general jurisdiction. If
a state capital does not have a federal appellate court, a federal trial
judge may be appointed to the seat. Even in this case, the federal
appellate court of that specific region makes the appointment. The
President of Brazil fills the last two judgeships by picking from six
knowledgeable lawyers of good moral standing nominated by the
state appellate court.
As demonstrated, even though there is an executive role in the
appointment to appellate court judgeships, it is not dominant, and
the executive follows a complex process involving several government
actors.
C.

Superior Courts Judgeships

"Superior Courts" is a general term for national courts of last resort regarding several subject matter jurisdictions that do not involve
constitutional issues: the Superior Court of Justice, the Superior Labor Court, the Superior Electoral Court, and the Superior Military
Court. Each of these courts has a specific method for selecting its
judges, and each of these methods is independently analyzed in the
following section.
1. The Superior Court of Justice
Except for issues related to the specialized federal courts divisions, the Superior Court of Justice (SuperiorTribunal de Justiga) is
the court of last resort for federal law appeals from the federal appellate courts of general jurisdiction and from state courts, among other
functions assigned by Article 105 of the Brazilian Constitution. 27
Currently, it is composed of thirty-three seats.
27. Article 105 of the Federal Constitution reads:
The Superior Court of Justice has the competence to: I - institute legal proceeding and trial, in the first instance, of: a) in common crimes, the
Governors of the states and of the Federal District, and, in such crimes and
in crimes of malversation, the judges of the Courts of Justice of the states
and of the Federal District, the members of the Courts of Accounts of the
states and of the Federal District, those of the Federal Regional Courts, of
the Regional Electoral and Labor Courts, the members of Councils or Courts
of Accounts of the municipalities and the members of the Public Prosecution
of the Union who act before court; b) writs of mandamus and habeas data
against an act of a Minister of State, or Commander of the Navy, the Army or
the Air Force, or of the Court itself; c) habeas corpus, when the constraining
party or the petitioner is any of the persons mentioned in subitem a, or when
the constraining party is a Minister of State, or Commander of the Navy, the
Army or the Air Force, except for the competence of the Electoral Courts; d)
conflicts of competence between any courts, except as provided in article 102,
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The judges of the Superior Court of Justice are appointed by the
President of Brazil from reputable, knowledgeable Brazilian citizens
between the ages of thirty-five and sixty-five years of age. After the
executive choice is made, the presidential nominee must be confirmed
by an absolute majority in the Senate.
Similar to the appellate court level, presidential leverage in making appointments is very limited. One-third of seats are reserved for
judges of federal appellate courts of general jurisdiction and onethird for state appellate judges. For these two categories of seats, the
Superior Court of Justice itself prepares a list of three nominees for
the President of Brazil to choose from. The remaining one-third of
seats is filled alternately by lawyers and both federal and state public
prosecutors, who are chosen through procedures and requirements
similar to those for the appellate courts. In other words, the Superior
Court of Justice distills a list of three nominees from six candidates
suggested either by the Brazilian Bar Association or by the public
prosecution, depending on which organization's turn it is. This list is
then presented to the President of Brazil so that he may select one of
the three nominees. As mentioned earlier, the President's choice is
subject to confirmation by the Senate.
2.

The Superior Labor Court

The Superior Labor Court (Tribunal Superiordo Trabalho)is the
court of last resort for appeals arising under labor law. It is composed
I, o, as well as between a court and the judges not subject to it and between
judges subject to different courts; e) criminal review of and the rescissory
actions against its decisions; f) claims for the preservation of its competence
and guarantee of the authority of its decisions; g) conflicts of duties between
administrative and judicial authorities of the Union, or between judicial authorities of one state and administrative authorities of another or of the
Federal District, or between those of the latter and those of the Union; h)
writs of injunction, when the drawing up of a regulation is the responsibility
of a federal body, entity, or authority, of the direct or indirect administration
with the exception of the cases within the competence of the Supreme Federal Court and of the bodies of the Military Justice, of the Electoral Justice,
of the Labor Justice and of the Federal Justice. i) the homologation of foreigner sentences and the granting of exequatur to rogatory letters; II - judge,
on ordinary appeal: a) habeascorpus decided in a sole or last instance by the
Federal Regional Courts or by the courts of the states, of the Federal District
and the Territories, in the event of a denial; b) writs of mandamus decided in
a sole instance by the Federal Regional Courts or by the courts of the states,
of the Federal District and the Territories, in the event of a denial; c) cases in
which the parties are a foreign state or international organization, on the one
part, and a municipality or a person residing or domiciled in the country, on
the other part; III - judge, on special appeal, the cases decided, in a sole or
last instance, by the Federal Regional Courts or by the courts of the states, of
the Federal District and the Territories, when the decision appealed: a) is
contrary to a treaty or a federal law, or denies it effectiveness; b) considers
valid an act of a local government contested in the light of a federal law; c)
confers upon a federal law an interpretation different from that which has
been conferred upon it by another court (. .
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of twenty-seven judges who are chosen from Brazilian citizens between the ages of thirty-five and sixty-five. One-fifth of the seats are
alternately reserved for lawyers with more than ten years of practice
in law and labor public prosecutors with more than ten years of work
experience. All other judgeships are reserved for career labor judges.
The President of Brazil appoints all judges to this Court. Here
again, presidential choice is very narrow. Following the same procedures of the Superior Court of Justice, the Superior Labor Court
presents three career judges to the President, who chooses one candidate to fill one seat reserved for career judges. As for the remaining
one-fifth of seats earmarked for lawyers and prosecutors, the Superior Labor Court prepares a list of three nominees out of six
candidates suggested either by the Brazilian Bar Association or by
the labor prosecution, depending on which organization's turn it is.
This list is then presented to the President of Brazil, who may choose
one of the three nominees. Again, all appointments made by the President require confirmation by the Senate.
3. The Superior Electoral Court
Along the lines of the electoral appellate courts, the Superior
Electoral Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral)has a diverse composition of seven members serving for a two-year period, with one
consecutive term allowed. Three of the seats on this Court are reserved for Supreme Court justices, who are chosen by secret ballot
conducted among the Supreme Court Justices. As a customary rule,
the Supreme Federal Court elects its members to the Superior Electoral Court according to seniority. In addition, two seats are filled by
members of the Superior Court of Justice, also selected by secret vote
by the Superior Court of Justice. Lastly, the President of Brazil appoints two lawyers from six knowledgeable candidates with flawless
conduct who were selected by the Supreme Court.
4.

The Superior Military Court

The Superior Military Court (SuperiorTribunal Militar)is a federal court of national jurisdiction on military crimes. In contrast to
the other Brazilian judicial systems, federal military courts do not
have the classical division into trial, appellate, and superior courts.
Instead, they have trial courts and one superior court only. Four military officers and one non-military career judge compose the military
trial courts. These non-military career judges are recruited by public
examination as described above.
Among other functions, the Superior Military Court has jurisdiction over appeals against military trial courts, as well as jurisdiction
over cases involving crimes committed by high-ranking military officers. It is composed of fifteen judges, five of whom are civilians.
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Superior Military Court judges are freely appointed by the President of Brazil among Brazilian citizens over the age of thirty-five, in
the following categories: three seats are set aside for Admirals of the
Navy; four seats go to Generals of the Army; three seats to Generals
of the Air Force; three seats to knowledgeable lawyers with flawless
conduct and more than ten years of practice; and, finally, two seats to
trial court judgeS28 and public prosecutors.
D.

The Supreme Court

As previously mentioned, the Supreme Court is the highest court
of Brazil. It is composed of eleven justices. Like the U.S. model, 29 the
constitutional authority for the appointment of Supreme Court justices rests with the President of Brazil, subject to Senate
confirmation by absolute majority. The Supreme Court appointment
process is unique in that it does not set aside seats for any specific
category of legal professionals. It does require nominees to be knowledgeable in law, have a flawless reputation, and be in a specific age
range-between thirty-five and sixty-five. Even so, it is in the appointment of Supreme Court seats that the executive has the greatest
leverage. However, judicial self-government guaranteed in Article 96,
I of the Federal Constitution grants the justices of the Supreme Court
the prerogative of electing, among themselves, the President and
Vice-President of the Court.3 0 As a customary rule, the Supreme
Court justices rotate as President and Vice-President, for a two-year
term, in order of seniority. 8 '
Brazil adopted the appointment process of the U.S. Constitution
in 1891. There have been passionate debates about the discretionary
power of the President of Brazil to appoint Supreme Court justices.3 2
28. The Superior Military Court's seats reserved for first instance judges refer to
non-military career judges only.
29. See Norman Dorsen, The Selection of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 4 INT'L J.
CoNsT. L. 652 (2006).
30. Article 96 of the Federal Constitution reads,
It is of the exclusive competence of: I - the courts: a) to elect their directive
bodies and to draw up their internal regulations, in compliance with the
rules of proceedings and the procedural guarantees of the parties, and regulating the competence and the operation of the respective jurisdictional and
administrative bodies; (b) (. .

31. One possible consequence of this rule of frequent rotation is to insulate the
President and the Vice-President of the Court from political pressure. Historically,
however, this rule was introduced in 1890 and the reason might have been to avoid
excessive concentration of power and internal rivalries.
32. Newton Tavares Filho, Democratizado do Processo de Nomeagdo dos Ministros do Supremo Tribunal Federal [Nomination Process of Justices of the Federal
Supreme Court], Consultoria Legislativa da Cmara dos Deputados (2006), available
at http://bd.camara.gov.br/bd/bitstream/handle/bdcamara/1596/democratizacao
processo tavares.pdf?sequence=1 (last visited Mar. 13, 2010); Hdlio Bicudo,
Nomeagdes para o Supremo Tribunal Federal [Nominations to the Federal Supreme
Court], Sept. 21, 2009, available at http://helio-bicudo.blogspot.com/2009/09/nomea
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Furthermore, the Brazilian Supreme Court appointment process has
lately been under severe scrutiny because of a massive reconfiguration of the composition of the Court. It came as a result of seven
justices reaching the mandatory retirement age, the voluntary retirement of two more justices, and the death of another, all within a nineyear period. With one exception, all of these losses occurred during
President Lula's terms of office. 3 3
The fact that one single President nominated more than half of
the Supreme Court justices brought a lot of attention to the selection
process and the future of the Supreme Court. We must note, however,
that the important changes in the composition of the Supreme Court
under President Lula may be attributed to an unusual combination of
34
circumstances. Indeed, previous Presidents were not so lucky.
In addition, Senate confirmation is required for Supreme Court
appointments. The Senate has refused to confirm five presidential
nominees at the end of the nineteenth century during President
coes-para-o-supremo-tribunal.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2010); Juristacritica sabatinas de indicados ao STF [Jurist criticizes public hearings of STF nominees], 0
Estado de Sao Paulo, Sept. 28, 2009, available at http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/
nacionaljurista-critica-sabatinas-de-indicados-ao-stf,442224,0.htm (last visited Mar.
13, 2010).
33. President Lula took office in 2003 for a four-year mandate and was subsequently reelected for a second term, which ended in December 2010. President Lula
appointed six of the current Justices of the Supreme Court and he left to his successor, newly-elected President Dilma Rousseff, one vacant seat to be filled due to the
mandatory retirement age of Justice Eros Grau in August 2010. See table below for
details:
Reason
Date of
Period in
Retirement
Office
Mandatory retirement
Apr 24, 2002
1981 - 2002
Ndri da Silveira
Mandatory retirement
Apr 22, 2003
1975 - 2003
Moreira Alves
Mandatory retirement
Apr 25, 2003
1984 - 2003
Sydney Sanches
Mandatory retirement
May 3, 2003
1991 - 2003
Ilmar Galvdo
Mandatory retirement
2004
8,
May
1994 - 2004
Mauricio Corr~a
Mandatory retirement
Jan 19, 2006
1990 - 2006
Carlos Velloso
Voluntary retirement
Mar 29, 2006
1997 - 2006
Nelson Jobim
Voluntary retirement(*)
Aug 17, 2007
1989 - 2007
Sepdlveda Pertence
Death
Sep 1, 2009
2007 - 2009
Menezes Direito
Mandatory retirement
Aug 19, 2010
2004 - 2010
Eros Grau
(*) Although this is technically a voluntary retirement, Justice Sepfilveda Pertence retired only
three months before he reached the mandatory retirement age of seventy years old, which was, in
fact, a consequence of the imminent age limit.
34. President Lula's eight appointments thus far exceed the five appointments by
President Sarney (1985-1990), four appointments by President Collor (1990-1992),
one single appointment by President Itamar Franco (1992-1995), and three appointments by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2003). In fact, one has to go
back to the military regime to find larger numbers, such as eight appointments made
by President Castelo Branco (1964-1967), seven appointments by President Ernesto
Geisel (1974-1979), and nine appointments by President Joao Figueiredo (1979-1985).
Justice
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Floriano Peixoto's3 5 term (1891 to 1894).36 At that time, the Senate
confirmation sessions were held behind closed doors and the Senate
only occasionally released the vote.3 7 After these initial setbacks, a
President never saw a nominee rejected by the Senate.
In the period after the proclamation of the Brazilian Republic in
1889,38 the Republican Constitution of 1891 replaced the first Brazilian Constitution of 1824, which was enacted during the Empire
period (1822-1889).39 Although heavily influenced by the American
Constitution, it also aimed to provide effective solutions to the
problems that the U.S. Supreme Court had encountered, such as the
35. President Floriano Peixoto was elected Vice-President in 1891 and replaced
President Deodoro da Fonseca after his resignation in November 1891. He was the
second Brazilian President after the fall of the Empire in 1889. President Peixoto
finished his term in November 1894. He was not a popular president and had several
political skirmishes with the Senate, including some over judicial appointments.
36. See Jost CELSO DE MELLO FILHO, NOTAs SOBRE o SUPREMO TRIBUNAL (IMPERIO

E REPJBLICA)

[NoTEs

ON

THE

FEDERAL

SUPREME

COURT (EMPIRE

AND

REPUBLIC)], at 17 (2007).
37. See details in the following table based on Maria Angela Jardim de Santa

Cruz Oliveira, Sobre a Recusa de Nomeag5es para o Supremo Tribunal Federal pelo
Senado [About the Refusal of Nominations to the Federal Supreme Court by the Sen-

ate],

25 REVISTA DE DIREITO POBLIco 68 (2009):
Senate Vote
(Favor-Against)

Main Argument Against
Nomination

Justice

Nomination

CA.ndido Barata Ribeiro

Oct 1893

(Se27

Anthnio Caetano Seve
Navarro

Sept 1894

(Oct 1894)

Innocencio Galvao de
Queiroz

Sept 1894

(Oct 1894)

Not enough knowledge
about the law
(iii)

Francisco Raymundo

Oct 1894

(Nov 1894)

No law degree

Probably political
(ii)

(iv)

Ewerton Quadros

Demosthenes da
Silveira Lobo

No law degree

Oct 1894
O

17-19
(Nov 1894)

Probably political
(v)

(i) Although being an experienced politician, the nominee was a medical doctor, which was considered insufficient by the Senate to satisfy the constitutional requirement of having knowledge
about the law. In fact, the constitutional requirement in 1891 generally required "having knowledge" but the Senate interpreted the requirement to be "having knowledge about the law."
(ii) The nominee was a Brazilian attorney with previous experience as state prosecutor, lawyer,
local judge and state congressman. He had represented the state of Rio Grande do Sul in the
lower house at the end of the Empire, 1886-1889.
(iii) Although the nominee had a bachelor's degree in law, he was also a general of the Brazilian
Army.
(iv) The nominee was a general, later a field marshal (July 1895). He had a bachelor's degree in
engineering, physics and mathematics.
(v) The nominee was the Postmaster General.
38. Brazil became independent from Portugal in 1822 when the Empire of Brazil
was established.
39. The imperial Constitution of 1824 established the "Supreme Court of Justice"
as the highest court in Brazil. The judicial nominations for this court did not require
the Senate's approval. See DE MELLO FILHO, supra note 36, at 17.
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constant change of the number of justices allowed on the Court 40 and
Congress' constant limitation of the Court's jurisdiction. 4 1 The fluctuations in these reflected the political evolution from the early
Republic to the end of the nineteenth century at which point the role
of the Supreme Court was pretty much settled. Obviously the Brazilian authorities did not want to repeat the entire historical process a
century later. Therefore, the Constitution of 1891 expressly established the Brazilian Supreme Court's composition of fifteen justices,
and explicitly described and defined the Court's jurisdiction. 4 2
Nonetheless, the 1930 Revolution reduced the Supreme Court's
composition to eleven justices by Decree 19656 of 1931, issued by the
Chief of the Provisional Government. At that occasion, six Supreme
Court justices were forced to retire from their judicial functions. 4 3
The eleven-justice composition was then maintained by the subsequent Constitutions of 193444 and 1937,45 both of which included the
possibility of an increase of seats up to sixteen if proposed by the Supreme Court.
The Constitution of 1934 was enacted by a National Constituent
Assembly to reestablish the democratic order. However, a coup d'gtat
occurred three years later and, soon after, the Constitution of 1937
was enacted to strengthen the powers of the executive. During these
periods (1930-1934 and 1937-1946), twenty-one justices were nominated to the Supreme Court without passing the Senate's scrutiny,
although the constitutional form of selection of justices of the Supreme Court required Senate approval. 4 6 As the dictatorship ended,
the democratic Constitution of 1946 maintained the same selection
process and number of seats on the Supreme Court.
Another coup d'gtat occurred in 1964. The number of seats on the
Supreme Court was augmented to sixteen by Institutional Act number 2 of 1965, which was subsequently reaffirmed by the Constitution
of 1967. However, in 1969 three Supreme Court justices were forced
to retire. 47 These positions were never filled because the Institutional
40. For example, the Judiciary Act of 1789, Judiciary Act of 1801, Repeal Act of
1802, Judiciary Act of 1807, Judiciary Act of 1837, Judiciary Act of 1863, Judiciary
Act of 1866, Judiciary Act of 1867, Judiciary Act of 1869.
41. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1869).
42. See Rui Barbosa, 0 Supremo Tribunal no Constituiqdo Brasileira [The Federal Supreme Court in the Brazilian Constitution], 2 REVISTA DO SUPREMO TRiBUNAL
393, at 395-96 (1914).
43. The following Justices were subject to compulsory retirement by Decree 19711
of 1931, a discretionary act of the Chief of the Provisional Government: Godofredo
Cunha, Muniz Barreto, Pires e Albuquerque, Pedro Mibieli, Pedro dos Santos, and
Geminiano da Franca.
44. Constitution of 1934, Article 73, sole paragraph.
45. Constitution of 1937, Article 97, sole paragraph and Article 98.
46. See DE MELLO FIHo, supra note 36, at 16.
47. Evandro Lins e Silva, Hermes Lima and Victor Nunes Leal were subject to
compulsory retirement from the Supreme Court by Decree of January 16, 1969; they
were essentially deposed by the military dictatorship.
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Amendment number 648 of 1969 reduced the number of seats on the
Supreme Court to eleven. Constitutional Amendment 1 of 1969 affirmed the composition of the Supreme Court with eleven members.
With democratization, the Constitution of 1988 preserved the
composition of the Supreme Court and introduced a requirement that
the Senate must hold a public hearing about the nominee at which he
or she is present and asked questions by the senators. 49 The Senate
Committee on Constitution, Justice and Citizenship (Comissdo de
Constituigdo, Justiga e Cidadania)conducts this hearing and votes
by secret ballot whether or not to recommend the nominee to the full
Senate. The full Senate votes by secret ballot on whether or not to
confirm the nominee.
Table one summarizes the changes in the composition of the Brazilian Supreme Court since independence in 1822.
TABLE ONE: SEATS OF THE SUPREME COURT SINCE
INDEPENDENCE (1822)50

Imperial Constitution of 1824
Federal Constitution of 1891
Decree n. 19.656 of 1931
Federal Constitution of 1934
Federal Constitution of 1937
Federal Constitution of 1946
Institutional Act n. 2 of 1965
Federal Constitution of 1967
Institutional Act n. 6 of 1969
Federal Constitution of 1969
Federal Constitution of 1988
III.

17
15
11
11
11
11
16
16
11
11
11

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE BRAZILIAN AND

U.S. MODELS
A.

General Analysis

It is clear that overall, the judicial selection in Brazil is significantly different from the American system. Generally speaking, U.S.
federal judges are nominated by the President and confirmed by the
Senate, while state judges are usually selected by gubernatorial ap48. Article 1 of Institutional Act number 6, issued on February 1, 1969.
49. Constitution of 1988, Article 52, III.
50. See DE MELLO FiLHo, supra note 36, at 8.
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pointment, commission nomination (the so-called merit commission)
or popular election. 5 ' The Brazilian court system has national features, with courts of heterogenous composition, where both federal
and state judge selections are bound by the same principles; as a result, the process of judicial appointment is the same for both federal
and state jurisdictions.
The most striking difference between judicial selection in Brazil
and the United States is that, at the trial level, the Brazilian process
of selecting judges is entirely administered by the judiciary, with no
executive participation whatsoever. At the appellate level, the executive only appoints one-fifth of the seats and, as indicated earlier,
there are very few candidates that the executive can choose from. The
judiciary itself appoints all of the remaining appellate court seats.
At the Superior Courts, the judiciary's involvement is still powerful even though executive participation increases. Even at this level,
presidential appointments are limited to short-listed candidates provided by the Superior Courts themselves, except for the Superior
Military Court appointments, where the President freely selects the
judges under certain categories.
Similar to the United States, in Brazil the most important executive role in the process of selecting judges is at the Supreme Court
level. Needless to say, the Supreme Court appointments are the most
controversial nominations because it is the highest court of the nation. Article II, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution prescribes that the
President shall nominate and, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, shall appoint judges to the Supreme Court. Over time,
the American Senate has refused to confirm almost a quarter of the
presidential nominations. 5 2
The system of Supreme Court appointment in Brazil is a
straightforward legal transplant of the American model. The Brazilian Senate has barred five confirmations in the beginning of the
Brazilian Republic, proclaimed in 1889,53 while the United States
Senate has rejected twelve nominees from 1789 to 2010.54 Although
51. See CHARLES F. ABERNATHY, LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: CASES AND MATERI(1995); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM: A SHORT DESCRIPTION
(2005), available at http//www.fc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ijr0003.pdfl$file/ijroOOO
3.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2010).
52. See NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND
MATERIALS (2003), and CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS AND CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2008). The Senate
has barred twenty-eight appointments (out of one hundred and fifty-one presidential
nominations). However, only twelve nominees were actually voted down. Others withdrew or were subject to filibuster.
53. See Oliveira, supra note 37.
54. The most recent defeat was that of Robert Bork in October 1987 who was
perceived as too conservative by a large majority of the Senate (forty-two in favor and
fifty-eight against). In addition, many of the recent confirmations were not unanimous and largely polarized. For example, consider the recent nominations of Justices
ALS
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statistically these numbers are not very different, the Brazilian senatorial rejections were concentrated in 1894 while the American
Senate has exercised the right not to confirm episodically but
throughout the entire period. Such trends reflect the fact that the
Brazilian Senate, unlike its United States counterpart, has not been
very obstinate concerning presidential nominations to the Supreme
Court. In short, the two Senates show a rather different degree of
deference toward the President, although the systems are similar.
There is yet another difference: the profiles of the Brazilian presidential choices contrast with the American ones. For instance,
among the seven most junior justices in Brazil, only two are career
judges and another came from a state appellate court to which he was
appointed from the bar (seat earmarked for lawyers). This is quite
different from the U.S. Supreme Court, where all current justices,
except one, have had very extensive experience on the federal appellate courts.5 5
B. Focusing on the Supreme Court
Throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the Brazilian system has thus not reproduced the same institutional features
as the American model. Differently from the U.S. system-where
"the Senate has by no means rubber-stamped presidential nominations" and presidents withdraw candidates when it is clear that the
Senate will not confirm them5 6-there exists a general feeling in Brazil that the Senate is largely deferential to the presidential choices
and avoids opposing presidential choices for political reasons. This is
reflected in the fact that no presidential nominee in Brazil has been
forced to withdraw or has been formally rejected by the Senate since
the end of the military dictatorship.
Several practical reasons explain why the Brazilian Senate has
not exercised a strong interventionist power during the confirmation
process.5 7 The most obvious explanation is that the president's party
Alito (2006, fifty-eight in favor and forty-two against), Sotomayor (2009, sixty-eight in
favor and thirty-one against), Kagan (2010, sixty-three in favor and thirty-seven
against) and Chief Justice Roberts (2005, seventy-eight in favor and twenty-two
against).
55. More generally about the U.S. Justices, see DAVID A. YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUs-

TICES (1999). Justice Elena Kagan is an exception in this respect, a point mentioned
by those opposing her confirmation by the United States Senate.
56. See DORSEN ET AL., supra note 52, or Paul A. Freund, Appointment of Justices:
Some HistoricalPerspectives, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1146 (1988). For example, the case of
Harriet Miers nominated and withdrawn by President George W. Bush in 2005. For
details on the nomination of Harriet Miers, see JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME
CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR THE
STATES SUPREME COURT (2007).

CONTROL

OF THE

UNITED

57. On the interventionist role of the U.S. Senate and the role played by the President, see, among others, HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL
HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT (1992) and HENRY J. ABRAHAM,
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is usually able to achieve a majority in the Senate by forming coalitions with other parties. While in the United States there are only
two political relevant parties, Brazil has many parties and that the
president's coalition party usually faces only a minority opposition in
the Senate. In cases where the nominations are highly controversial,
presidents make concessions to opposing senators in their interest areas, therefore reaching political compromises that regularly produce
a successful, although contentious, confirmation.
In the course of judicial reform talks in Brazil over the past few
years, there were a few amendment proposals to change the method
of selecting Supreme Court justices but none have been seriously considered thus far. Discussion regarding the judicial selection process
for Supreme Court justices arises every time there is a vacant seat on
the court. While proposals for constitutional amendments have been
presented in Congress, there is still no consensus as to what should
be reformed. Table two summarizes the appointments to the Court
since the 1988 Constitution. We chose to focus on the last twentythree years since democracy was reinstated in 1988 because it would
be too difficult to make meaningful comparisons between the U.S.
and Brazilian systems while Brazil was under a nondemocratic
regime.5 8

JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHNGTON TO CUNTON (1999). For severe criticism, see JOHN A.
MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (1995).

58. See Lemos & Llanos, supra note 18, for a political interpretation of each confirmation vote.
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TABLE

Two:

APPOINTMENTS TO THE BRAZILIAN SUPREME COURT
59
SINCE THE 1988 CONSTITUTION
Year of
nt

JusticeApi

Year of Retirement/
Expected Year of

President

Retirement

Paulo Brossard
Sepilveda.
ve

Celso de Mello
Carlos Velloso

1989
1989
[Chief Justice
1995-1997]
1989
[Chief Justice
1997-19991
1990
[Chief Justice
1999-2001]

1994

Jos6 Sarney

2007

Jos6 Sarney

2015

Josh Sarney

2006

Fernando
Coll r

Marco Aur61io
Mello

1990
[Chief
Justice
2001-20031

2016

Fernando
Collor

Ilmar Galvio

1991

2003

Fernando
Color

Francisco Rezek

1992

1997

Fernando

2004

Itamar
Franco

a
1994
Maurcao
[Chief Justice
Corr~a2003-2004]
Nelson Jobim
Ellen Gracie
Gilmar Mendes
Cezar Peluso

1997
[Chief Justice
2004-2006]
2000
[Chief Justice
2006-2008]
2002
[Chief Justice
2008-2010]
2003LusIci
[Chief Justice

2018
2025

2012

Lussdanioa

2003

2012

2003

2024

Luis InAcio
Lula da Silva
Luis InAcio

2010-20121

Carlos Ayres
Britto
Joaquim

Fernando
Henrique
Cardoso
Fernando
Henrique
Cardoso
Fernando
Henrique
Cardoso

2006

Lula da Silva

Barbosa

Eros Grau

2004

2010

Ricardo
Lewandowski

2006

2018

LulsdanSia
Luis InAcio
Lula da Silva

Cdrmen Licia

2006

2024

L

2007

Deceased
(September 1,

Menezes Direito

2009)

Dias Toffoli

2009

2037

Luiz Fux

2011

2023

ssdanSila

Lis Indcio
Lula da Silva
L

sdanSila
saef

59. For a detailed list ofjudicial appointments to the Court before 1988, see httpi/
www.stf.jus.br/arquivo/cms/sobreStfComposicaoMinistroApresentacao/anexo/Linha

sucessoriatabela_1_9_09.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2010).
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C. A Search for Explanations
At first glance, a general explanation could simply be that the
Brazilian Senate may not play the active role the U.S. Senate plays
in shaping policies across different areas. There have indeed been periods in Brazilian history where such attitude prevailed (such as the
1930-1934 and 1937-1946). However, with the 1988 Constitution, the
Brazilian Senate became a strong political player. For instance, the
Senate Committee on External Relations and National Defense
(Comissdo de Relagdes Exteriores e Defesa Nacional) has recently
blocked the public hearings of the Presidential nominations of thirteen new Ambassadors in response to Brazilian foreign policy under
the Lula administration, in particular, Brazil's stance on Cuban dissidents and nuclear sanctions against Iran.6 0 While strong and
interventionist in other areas, it is clear that the Brazilian Senate
has not followed the American approach to judicial confirmations
during most of the twentieth century. As mentioned earlier, in 121
years of Brazil's republican government (from 1889 to 2010) the Brazilian Senate rejected only five presidential nominees to the Supreme
Court,6 1 while in 221 years of independent government in the United
States the U.S. Senate declined twelve presidential nominees (from
1789 to 2010). Yet, at least in the last twenty years, the reason why
the Brazilian Senate did not adopt the role played by the U.S. Senate
in judicial confirmations does not seem related to lack of power to do
SO.
The development of a different use of power is even more surprising when we acknowledge the similarities of some of the formal
details. The Senate Committee on Constitution, Justice and Citizenship (Comissdo de Constituiqdo, Justiga e Cidadania)dominates the
Brazilian confirmation process. This committee hears the candidates
and then makes a recommendation to the full Senate (such recommendation is made by the twenty-three senatorial members of the
Committee). In the United States, the Senate Judiciary Committee
plays an identically active role. The questioning of presidential nomi-

60. See PSDB declara ruptura com politica externa brasileira.Azeredo suspende
sabatinasde embaixadores [PSDB declares its rupture with Brazilian external policy.
Azeredo suspends public hearings of ambassadors],press release of the Senate Press
Agency (Agancia Senado), Mar. 16, 2010, available at http://www.senado.gov.br/
Agencia/verNoticia.aspx?codNoticia=100121&codAplicativo=2 (last visited Apr. 13,
2010). See also Azeredo wants a "more active" Senate in the debate on foreign policy,
press release of the Senate Press Agency International (Agancia Senado International), Apr. 9, 2010, available at http://www.senado.gov.br/Agencia/internaciona/en/
not_1007.aspx.
61. See DE MELLO FiLHo, supra note 36, at 17.
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nees began in 1939 with the confirmation of Justice Felix
Frankfurter. 6 2
Another similarity is the role played by the local bar organizations. As we have seen before, the Brazilian Bar Association (Ordem
dos Advogados do Brasil) has a significant role in the process of judicial appointments by the President to the appellate and superior
courts (with the exception of the Supreme Court).
In the United States, the American Bar Association has played
an informal role in the nomination and confirmation process since the
late 1940s.63 President George W. Bush decided to eliminate the role
of the ABA as an informal gatekeeper, due to his perception that the
organization had a liberal bias. Conflicts between the Brazilian Bar
Association and other institutional actors in the appointment process
have also occurred. Recently, these conflicts emerged between the
Brazilian Bar Association and the judiciary itself (but not between
the Brazilian Bar Association and the President). In 2008, the Superior Court of Justice decided to reject all six of the candidates that the
Brazilian Bar Association suggested 6 4 (as explained earlier, the Superior Court of Justice selects three candidates out of a pool of six,
and the President ultimately selects one). The Supreme Court upheld
that decision in October 2009 by denying the Brazilian Bar Association's appeal.6 5 The Brazilian Bar Association eventually provided a
new list for the vacant seat in 2010.66
In our opinion, one cannot simply attribute the largely deferential behavior of the Brazilian Senate to the President's appointments
to the Supreme Court to a mere path dependence, either. A military
dictatorship (1964-1985) and a largely negotiated political transition
62. See ABRAHiAMs, supra note 57. Felix Frankfurter was an Associate Justice of
the United States Supreme Court from January 1939 to August 1962. He was nominated by President Roosevelt and confirmed by the Senate without dissent.
63. Since 1946, the ABA has established a Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary in an advisory role on the selection of, among others, Supreme Court Justices.
After a candidate is nominated, the ABA Committee investigates the merits and rates
the nominee according to "well qualified," "not opposed," or "not qualified." These advisory ratings tend to have great sway on the Senate Judiciary Committee and on the
Senate. Details available at http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/SCpage/fescprocess.pdf
(last visited Apr. 11, 2010).
64. See STJ veta lista de indicaq6es da OAB e abre crise [SCJ vetoes the list of
appointments by the BBA, and causes a crisis], Feb. 14, 2008, http://www.estadao.
com.br/noticias/nacional,stj-veta-lista-de-indicacoes-da-oab-e-abre-crise,124445,0.htm
(last visited Sept. 27, 2010).
65. See Mantida decisdo do STJ de rejeitar lista saxtupla da OAB paraescolha de
ministro daquelacorte [Upholding the decision of the STJ to reject the OAB's sextuple
list to select a judge of that court], Brazilian Supreme Court press release, Oct. 6,
2009, availableat http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verNoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo
=114297&caixaBusca=n.
66. See OAB preencherd vagas no STJ [BBA will fill vacancies at SCJ], Federal
Justice at the State of Rond6nia press release on Aug. 10, 2010, available at http://
www.ro.trfl.gov.br/noticias/2010/OAB%20preencher%E1%20vagas%20no%20STJ.
htm.
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(1985-1988) certainly reinforced a strong presidential tradition and
hurt the establishment of an equally strong legislature. Still, given
the political importance of the Brazilian Congress since the late
1980s, one cannot observe a path dependence in other political
contexts.
D. Same Transplant,Different Outcomes: Looking at the United
States
A detailed look at the case of the United States suggests reasons
why the Brazilian Senate has not adopted a more contentious approach to Supreme Court confirmations. By the time Brazil adopted
the U.S. model in the late nineteenth century, the importance of the
Supreme Court and the role of the Senate as a limit to presidential
choices was firmly established in the United States. The process of
senatorial confirmation had produced several clashes between presidents and senators by the 1890s. At that time the process in the
United States was essentially about particular partisan agendas and
a means to express opposition to any presidential actions that the
Senate did not like. The switch in the United States from punishing
the President for occasional disagreements to a recurrent ideological
rejections of nominees occurred in the twentieth century and was
strongly entrenched by the twenty-first. 6 7
At the same time, for other federal judicial appointments in the
United States, a presumption of senatorial courtesy was in place by
the 1890s: the nominee should be agreed upon by both the President
and the Senator from the home state. The presumption of senatorial
courtesy established a guarantee that judicial appointments for district and appellate courts were generally less contentious. This
presumption of senatorial courtesy declined for most of the twentieth
century, and was replaced in the 1970s by the same ideological divisions that taint the Supreme Court appointments. At best, senatorial
courtesy has been replaced by courtesy to the President's party.6 8
The dynamics of judicial appointments in the United States reflect the political importance of its judiciary. Whatever the intentions
were at the Constitutional Convention, the U.S. Supreme Court
emerged as a political actor of fundamental importance, as a product
of Jeffersonian anger in the early 1800s and of Jacksonian defiance in
the 1820s. 69 From then on, the U.S. Supreme Court, in an effort to
achieve judicial supremacy, constantly sought to broaden its power.
The initial deference of the Court toward Congress eroded over time
and major crises occurred during the 1930s and in the late twentieth
67. See GARDNER GEYH, supra note 52.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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century. 7 0 The political authority of the Supreme Court was based on
case law that reflects the cyclical rise and fall of judicial activism.
One cannot say that the U.S. Supreme Court has achieved its
current political role and influence solely by judicial construction.
The other two branches of government, as well as the states, presumably could have undermined such a construction if they felt the need
to do so. Apart from well-known skirmishes, such as during the New
Deal in 1937, there has been little use of impeachment procedures,
the possibility of court packing, constitutional amendments or other
mechanisms to limit the power of the Supreme Court. 7 ' One has to
conclude that the various political actors have allowed the emergence
of a politically strong Supreme Court because it is in their interest. 7 2
The U.S. Supreme Court has emerged as a strong referee between the federal government and the states. States naturally
favored such a development to avoid the control of the federal government by particular (larger or wealthier) states and, more
importantly, to protect extensive state powers. As the bipartisan political system was established by the late nineteenth century, both
parties were inclined to accept the strong role of the federal judiciary
and the Supreme Court, mainly as a mechanism to limit the influence of the party that currently controlled Congress and to avoid
sidelining the party in opposition. The fact that no party has controlled the political establishment of the United States for a long
period of time has allowed the judiciary to emerge as a politically
powerful branch. Thus, the influence and power of the U.S. Supreme
Court are the result of a combination of specific interests competing
in the public sphere.7 3
Because of its politically strong position, the U.S. Supreme Court
attracts attention from many different political actors. It is not surprising, therefore, that the process of nomination and confirmation
has become more contentious. The President and the Senate view the
Supreme Court's role as the shaper of policies and legacies for the
future. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court constrains the constitutional agenda of future presidential terms. 7 4 The political
repercussions that stem from a single judicial appointment have become glaringly obvious and have made the ideology behind a selection
very important.7 5 The behavior of the Supreme Court justices seems
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY:
THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U. S. HisTORY (2007).

73. See William Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an
Interest-GroupPerspective, 18 J. L. ECON. 875 (1975).
74. See GREENBURG, supra note 56.

75. The polarization of Congress has generated more negotiated legislation that

ex post invites the intervention of the courts. Unlike other common law jurisdictions,
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to support such a view given the their adherence to what has been
called by political scientists the attitudinal model.7 6
The prevalence of precedent and the respect that the U.S. Supreme Court commands from other federal and state courts
reinforces the view that judicial selection for the highest bench of the
country is bound to raise political expectations and serious ideological
concerns. 7 7
E.

Same Transplant,Different Outcomes: Looking at Brazil

The importance of the U.S. Supreme Court, as well as the strong
political role of the U.S. Senate in judicial appointments, was well
established by the early 1890s. Consequently, when the U.S. system
was transplanted to Brazil it was expected that Brazil would also embrace an active Senate. As history has shown, that was indeed the
case in the early days but then changed over the last century.
Before 1988, it is hard to make a direct comparison between the
U.S. and the Brazilian Senate given the different political regimes.78
However, once democracy was reestablished in 1988, the Brazilian
Senate emerged as an active political body in many political areas,
including constitutional amendments.7 9 Public hearings, now broadcasted live on television, made the confirmation process of judicial
nominations accessible to all Brazilian citizens as well as strenuous
and transparent. However, the deferential attitude concerning the
President's judicial nominations remained unchanged.
There are three possible reasons why the Brazilian Senate did
not adopt a contentiously active role.
The composition of the Brazilian Supreme Court does not display
the ideological configuration that is present on the U.S. Supreme
Court. The Brazilian Supreme Court has less ideological and party
tensions surrounding their appointments. Because of the career judiciary's predominance in other courts, the majority of Brazilian
justices nominated after 1988 are detached from the career judiciin many cases, ex ante political intervention and discussion by the U.S. Congress has
been replaced by ex post judicial intervention. The growing need for more statutory
interpretation has further politicized the federal judiciary. See generally JUDICIAL AcTIvism IN COMMON LAw SUPREME COURTS (Brice Dickson ed., 2007).
76. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
77. See THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS II, THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT
ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (2006).
78. For a detailed discussion of the impact of democracy on the appointment and
confirmation processes in Brazil, see Mariana Prado & Claudia Turner, A Democracia

e o seu Impacto nas Nomeagdes dos Diretores das Agkncias Reguladorase Ministros do
STF [Democracy and its Impact on the Nominations of Directors of Regulatory Agencies and Justices of the FSCI, 250 REVISTA DE DIREITO ADMINISTRATIVO 27 (2009).

79. There have been sixty-four constitutional amendments since 1988, some of
them reshaping the judiciary, such as Emenda Constitucionalnumber 45, December
2004.
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ary.8 0 The influence of the civil law tradition has also contributed to
the development of a particular type of legal formalism (in particular,
deference to the legislator) that contrasts with the contentious political activism that surrounds the U.S. Supreme Court.8 1 As a result,
the clashes between ideological majority and minority that are frequent on the U.S. Supreme Court are rare in Brazil. 82 Such clashes
do occur, but they involve particular issues and the line-up in the
Court is fairly independent from previously defined ideological tendencies or coalitions. Yet the Brazilian Supreme Court is decidedly
activist in highly relevant areas,8 3 particularly its competence regarding abstract judicial review. In fact, legal scholars have
recognized the activism of the Court in areas of social legislation, creation and development of new rights, and access to justice.8 4 For
example, the Court has struck down the law regulating the press (Lei
da Imprensa), which had been in force since 1967. In recent times,
the Court has also heard cases involving stem cells, complaints
against the public health care system, and affirmative action in public universities.
Unlike its U.S.-American counterpart, the Brazilian Supreme
Court has historically had little control over its docket because it does
not have a writ of certiorari. It is true that there is now a new requirement of "general interest for admission of extraordinary
appeals": if an appeal does not achieve the status of general interest
or general repercussion, review is immediately declined by the Court.
This requirement, in place only since 2007, is expected to reduce the
workload and allow the Court to focus on more important cases.8 5
80. Of the nineteen justices appointed since 1988 (see Table two), only four were
previously career judges. If we include judges who served at appellate or superior
courts by appointment under the quinto constitutional as explained before (they have
judicial experience but are not technically career magistrates), the number goes up to
seven, thus thirty-seven percent of the sample.
81. See Nuno Garoupa & Maria Alejandra Maldonado, The Judiciaryin Political
Transitions: The CriticalRole of U.S. Constitutionalismin Latin America, CARDOZO J.
INT'L & ComP. L. (forthcoming 2011).
82. Unfortunately, there are few empirical studies about the attitudinal model in
Brazil, but the existing literature shows a pattern of less polarized division than in
the United States. See discussion by Garoupa & Maldonado, id.
83. For a discussion of the behavior of the Supreme Court from a political and
economic perspective, see Lee J. Alston, Marcus Melo, Bernardo Mueller & Carlos
Pereira, On the Road to Good Governance: Recovering from Economic and Political
Shocks in Brazil, in POLICYMAKING IN LATIN AMERICA: How POLITICS SHAPES POLICIES
(Ernesto Stein, Mariano Tommasi, Carlos Scartascini, & Pablo Spiller eds., 2008).
84. See Rog6rio B. Arantes, Constitutionalism, the Expansion of Justice and the
Judicializationof Politics in Brazil, in THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN LATIN
AMERICA (Rachel Sieder, Line Schjolden & Alan Angell eds., 2005). He sees two main
reasons for the increasing activism of the Court: (i) The constitutionalization of welfare rights preventing rights and principles from being altered after new elections,
and (ii) the length of the 1988 Constitution and the profusion of amendments which
has empowered the Court.
85. The Emenda Constitucionalnumber 45, December 2004, introduced a mechanism that could in principle approximate the writ of certiorariunder the name of a
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Still, the Court's historical inability to select cases has affected its
activism only insignificantly. The main difference, in our view, is that
the level and scope of activism is less partisan-oriented in Brazil than
in the United States.
Finally, the absence of a general principle of stare decisis and
strong precedent has reduced the Supreme Court's power to bind the
lower courts in the past.8 6 This absence is in line with the civil law
tradition although it has recently been tempered by the new samula
vinculante.8 7 In fact, the main criticism regarding the new samula
vinculante system is that it empowers the Brazilian Supreme Court
and reduces heterogeneity across courts, therefore arguably impairing the independence of the lower tribunals.8 8 For all these
institutional reasons, the composition of the Brazilian Supreme
Court has not attracted the ideologically partisan attention to make
the Senate confirmation more controversial.
As discussed before, the emergence of the political importance of
the U.S. Supreme Court is in part derived from the balance of power
between the federal and state governments. In Brazil, the states have
limited power and the resulting influence of the federal government
is overwhelming.8 9 American federalism was the result of transfer of
sovereignty by each of the thirteen colonies to the center. By contrast,
requirement of general interest (requisito da repercussdo geral). Article 102, paragraph 3 of the Brazilian Constitution has stated since 2004: "In the extraordinary
appeal, the appellant shall prove the general repercussion of the constitutional issues
discussed in the case, as prescribed by law, in order for the Court to examine the
admission of the appeal, the refusal being permitted only by voting of two thirds of the
Justices." As a consequence, the implementing Law 11418/2006 limits the court jurisdiction to appeals of general interest or of general impact (social, economic, political or
legal). It has been applied since 2007 and has raised significant legal issues that are
beyond the scope of the present Article.
86. Before the existence of samula vinculante, courts could apply different legal
reasoning than that of the Supreme Court. Even when courts followed the Supreme
Court decisions, this previous system did not bar appeals, hence allowing excessive
and inefficient appeals, such as strategic appeals with the sole purpose of postponing
the enforcement of an unfavorable judgment. For a discussion about the search for
judicial supremacy in Brazil, see Diego Werneck Arguelhes, 0 Supremo na Politica:a
Construqdo da Supremacia Judicial no Brasil, [The Supreme Court in Politics: The
Construction of Judicial Supremacy in Brazil] 250 REVISTA DE DIREITO ADMINIsTRATvo 5 (2009).

87. Introduced by the Emenda Constitucional number 45, December 2004, the
sdmula vinculante is a one-sentence-pronouncement issued by the Brazilian Supreme
Court, with binding effect on all other courts, which states clearly the interpretation
the Brazilian Supreme Court gave to a constitutional issue. For instance, sdmula
vinculante n.12 reads: "Charging enrollment fees to students in public universities
violates article 206, IV, of the Federal Constitution." At the date of writing this Article, the Brazilian Supreme Court has issued thirty-one sdmulas vinculantes. For more
details on the sdmula vinculante, see Oliveira, supra note 14.
88. Arantes, supra note 84, suggests that the new simula vinculante has been
criticized and badly received by the sectors that want to use the courts strategically
for political goals or to avoid expensive claims.
89. See CHARLES D. COLE, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: BRAZIL AND THE
UNITED STATES (2d ed. 2008).
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Brazilian federalism, more familiar to British devolution, derives
from the central government's delegation of powers to the states.
Moreover, Brazil's governmental system includes three actors: the
federation, the state, and the municipalities.9 0 Quite simply, the federal government in Brazil has considerably more power over the
states than the U.S. federal government. As explained, the Brazilian
Supreme Court can broadly review state laws and state courts' decisions.9 ' Consequently, the Brazilian Supreme Court's role in actively
refereeing conflicts between the federal government and the states is
not nearly as strong as in the United States. Instead, the Brazilian
Supreme Court is the paramount referee in conflicts of federalism
and separation of powers within the state and federal spheres of government (e.g., the state legislature/governor conflicts, congress
minorities/president conflicts). 9 2 Although these conflicts are politically relevant, due to the large number and instability of political
parties, they do not result in a partisan division of the Court.
Finally, unlike the United States, Brazil does not have a stable
two-party system. Since democracy was consolidated in 1988, a multitude of parties have emerged. Currently, more than ten political
parties have at least one senator in a Senate of eighty-one. As a result, the Brazilian Senate is neither polarized nor structured around
two stable coalitions. Instead it moves in conjunction with the needs
of a presidential majority. At the same time, there are no clear alternations of political cycles. Some parties frequently move in and out of
the presidential majority. Therefore, it is much easier for the President to rally support for his nominees than it is for a diffuse, divided,
and heterogeneous opposition to undermine or block confirmation.
Additionally, the fragmentation of the party system supports the
building of the needed consensus out of the public eye instead of
utilizing specialized public committee meetings or the plenary of the
Senate.
90. Id.
91. Id. (so can the United States Supreme Court though only with regard to compliance with the federal Constitution and other federal law).
92. The judicialization of political questions has become a relevant phenomenon
in the Supreme Court due to its power to review the constitutionality of federal and
state laws in abstract. It is fairly common that a losing minority in Congress requests
the Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of a newly-enacted law which they
opposed, but did not succeed in blocking, in Congress. For more detailed information
on minority parties/President conflicts before the judiciary, see Matthew M. Taylor,
Working the Courts: The Worker's Party and the Judicializationof Politics in Brazil
(paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association), available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p6lll5index.html. For state
legislature-governor conflicts refereed by the Supreme Court, see Iran Rodrigues,
Judicializationof Politics: ConstitutionalReview and Intrastate Litigiousnessin Contemporary Brazil (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political
9
Science Association) (2009), available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p27570
index.html.
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Still, the distinctive evolution of the U.S. transplant in Brazil
also achieves a particular balance of power between the elected political actors (the President and Congress) and the non-elected ones (the
judiciary). We believe that the existence of a career judiciary and the
limited powers of the President when it comes to appointments of recognition judiciary to the Superior Courts provide another explanation
for the largely deferential approach taken by the Brazilian Senate.
In a sense, a deferential Senate compensates the President for
the limited powers he has in shaping the Brazilian judiciary. By contrast, in the United States the President has enormous influence in
shaping the federal judiciary. A less deferential Senate is thus
needed to introduce some checks and balances into the U.S. federal
system of judicial selection.
In fact, by enhancing the presidential powers, a deferential Brazilian Senate contributes to a more effective system of checks and
balances between the federal government and the career judiciary. In
the United States, a deferential Senate in an institutional environment without a career judiciary would likely result in overwhelming
power of the President over the entire federal judiciary. In Brazil, by
contrast, continuous conflicts between the President and the Senate
over appointments to the Supreme Court would likely enhance the
position of the career judiciary because of the weak Presidential influence over the federal appellate courts and superior courts.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This Article discussed the current system of judicial selection in
Brazil and how it compares to the U.S. model. For entry level judges
in Brazil, the standard civil law shortcoming is observed, namely that
career judges are hired at a very young age. However, we can also
find the standard advantage of a career judiciary, that is, significant
insulation from political pressure.
This Article also discussed the legal transplant of the U.S. system of judicial appointments to the Supreme Court to Brazil and
noted that this transplant did not result in a contentious Brazilian
Senate confirmation process. We proposed a multitude of explanations that rely on local determinants, particularly the lack of a clearcut bipartisan ideology of the Court, the party system, the particularities of Brazilian federalism, and the balance between career and
recognition judiciaries.
We must emphasize that the Article is completely agnostic as to
which institutional developments (United States or Brazil) are more
adequate or which approach adopted by the respective Senates results in a more qualified judiciary. Our purpose was to recognize and
explain why similar constitutional rules have evolved into different
practices. In no way does this Article suggest that a particular prac-
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tice is better or worse than another. It seems that both practices
accommodate the local institutional needs to balance the various political powers involved.

560

Q

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW

[Vol. 59

2011]

561

CHOOSING JUDGES IN BRAZIL

00
*0

0

;T

oo

z*~

d

co

-

-

-

oo0~

0

c*

2 "1

0

.0

S

-~-

*

Q)

.

o

~~~

0.r

co

>

0

0o

ca

..

>.

0

0

C0

0

o

.

14

4. ZZ

"o
0

0

~

0-

.0

-

w

M.

0

0

0

0

a)

0

~

0~

o

~0.~

.

0

0

0
0

0
0.~0

0)

.00

-'

.0

.

0
z

a)bf
obl

W

-0
.0

0

o

~~

j

CL

P4

0

z
Z

00

.

co

4

'o.0.
0

0

Z

z

00

0

003

w. )

E

0

0.0

110

u

.0

u

C

m~O

~

Q

co

~

2 o
o

0

0m.
a)

0,4

.0

-

0

0

0

0

'5 c

4

.20
*lz0

cod.0

0

z

co~

0-

00o

0

a)~
j

.

0

y.

o

0

a).

Od

~

.

0.

a)

o

0

o5

40.

0
42l
0..-a)

1.0

o

3..

~~
z0

0

0

.0-

0

0

0

-

.0

0

~~

0-.

~

0

o~

0

m0-

o

-0.(D

w

Lo0

coO

b,

0

562

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW

[Vol. 59

